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Egypt is ranked 36th out of 178 states in the 
2018 Fragile States Index conducted by The 
Fund For Peace.1 The index placed Egypt 
under the “high warning” category—in 
which higher scores indicate higher levels of 
fragility—with a score of 88.7 out of 120. The 
report suggests that Egypt is most fragile 
in the areas of human rights and the rule of 
law (9.9/10) and group grievances (8.9/10) 
(Figure 1). While Egypt is a state founded on 
equal citizenship regardless of religious or 
ethnic identity, long-standing grievances 
among minority groups such as the Copts, 
the Shiites, the Nubians, and the Bedouins 
indicate fundamental problems with regard 
to the state of pluralism in Egypt.
 This brief examines the status of Egypt’s 
different ethnic and religious communities 
and intercommunal divisions, with an 
emphasis on the policy implications of 
entrenching pluralism. Specifically, questions 
to be explored include: What grievances 
have the different minority groups in Egypt 
experienced? How can Egypt become a more 
inclusive state for the different ethnic and 
religious groups? The analysis focuses on 
the following communities: Copts, Nubians, 
Shiites, and Bedouins in Sa’id and Sinai. 
 Pluralism in Egypt is an urgent issue. 
Violence against minorities is increasingly 
becoming the principal mechanism for 
resolving intercommunal conflicts. This 
is evident in recent attacks against the 
Copts, the Sufis, and the Shiites; for 
instance, two Christian churches and one 
Sufi-affiliated mosque (Rawda mosque 
in Sinai) were bombed in 2017, which 
resulted in the deaths of about 50 and 
305 individuals, respectively.2 Additionally, 
Copts and prominent Shiite figures were 
targeted and assassinated in several 
different incidents; for instance, four Shiite 
figures were assassinated in 2013 and 
two Coptic churches were bombed on 
Palm Sunday in 2017.3 Despite Egyptian 
President Abdel Fattah El Sisi’s emphasis on 
inclusion, progress has been minimal in part 
because the state refuses to acknowledge 
discrimination against different religious and 
ethnic communities. Moreover, these ethnic 
and religious minorities are marginalized 
by the state, the media, and other societal 
actors, worsening the problem. 
I. COPTS
The Copts are the largest minority group 
in Egypt and constitute the majority of the 
Christians in the country. They account for 
approximately 10% of the country’s overall 
population.4 There are three “clusters” of 
Copts in Egypt: in the Minya-Assiut region 
(17.6% of the region’s total population), in 
the Assiut-Sohag region (15.1%), and in the 
Greater Cairo region (9.4%).5 The Copts have 
been allocated 24 seats in parliament based 
on a religious quota,6 which was instituted 
in the 2014 electoral law codified under 
interim president Adly Mansour. The law 
stipulates that parliamentary members may 
be elected through individual campaigns for 
specific seats and via closed absolute lists 
whereby voters can only vote for the list 
Despite Egyptian 
President Abdel Fattah 
El Sisi’s emphasis on 
inclusion, progress 
has been minimal in 
part because the state 
refuses to acknowledge 
discrimination against 
different religious and 
ethnic communities.
10.05.18ISSUE BRIEF
2RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 10.05.18
holding between one and three ministry 
positions under the Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak, 
and Morsi administrations.
 Additionally, Copts suffer the effects 
of discriminatory language in official 
discourse that categorizes them as 
second-class citizens. Although the 
2014 constitution guarantees freedom 
of religion, it also declares Islam as the 
official religion of the state and prohibits 
conversion to any other religion.9 
Furthermore, attacks against Christians in 
Northern Egypt who sought to build new 
churches were reported in May 2018.10 
 Copts also are often subject to eruptions 
of violence.11 Various radical Islamist groups 
in Egypt like Wilayat Sinai (an Islamic State 
affiliate in Sinai) have targeted Coptic 
churches, religious figures, and church-
goers of all ages. For instance, on Palm 
Sunday in April 2017, Coptic churches St. 
George’s Coptic Cathedral in Tanta and 
St. Mark’s Coptic Orthodox Cathedral in 
as a whole, and that each party list should 
include at least three Christians among its 15 
candidates.7 In addition to the 24 allocated 
seats, 12 individual Coptic candidates were 
elected to parliament, bringing the total 
number of Coptic members of parliament to 
36 out of 596 total MPs.8 
 Egyptian Copts face various challenges 
to their inclusion into the country’s social, 
economic, and political realms. One of the 
main challenges is their relative absence 
from prominent public roles; few Copts serve 
as university presidents or governors, or in 
sensitive military and security positions, for 
example. Likewise, Copts are largely excluded 
from Egypt’s political life, particularly with 
regard to cabinet positions; their presence 
in the cabinet recently dropped from three 
out of 36 ministry positions to just one out 
of 32 (MP Nabila Makram), following El-Sisi’s 
cabinet changes in June 2018. Copts had 
always been nominally represented in the 
cabinet since Egypt’s independence in 1952, 
FIGURE 1 — EGYPT’S RANKING IN THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX, 2014–2018
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Alexandria suffered deadly attacks, with 
about 50 people killed.12 In April 2013, 
several Coptic churches were destroyed 
following a sectarian clash between Muslims 
and Christian Copts in the town of Khosus 
in northern Cairo. The Egyptian government 
promised to reconstruct the damaged 
sanctuaries; however, these pledges 
have thus far not been fulfilled.13 Less 
importantly, yet still significant, Copts also 
face discrimination in sports; some Coptic 
football players “had been excluded from 
national and international competitions due 
to their religious identity.”14 
 
II. NUBIANS
Nubia was an ancient African kingdom 
around the Nile that extended from the Nile 
River Valley in Upper Egypt eastward to the 
shores of the Red Sea, south to Khartoum, 
and west toward the Libyan Desert. Nubia 
had its own autonomy within Egypt under 
King Farouk and had minimal relations with 
Egypt prior to the 1952 revolution.15 Yet 
post-1952, the Egyptian regime became 
overtly involved in Nubia after the Aswan 
High Dam flooded the Nubians’ residences in 
the Nubian valley and consequently ruined 
it. This was detrimental to Nubians; the 
7,000-year-old kingdom has nothing left of 
its historical boundaries but “a thin, sparsely 
populated strip of land along the Nile that's 
now bisected by the Egypt-Sudan border 
and is crossable only by boat.”16 While the 
U.S. Library of Congress estimated that there 
were around 160,000 Nubians in Egypt in 
1990, National Geographic in 2014 estimated 
their population to be around 300,000,17 
divided across three different linguistic 
groups: “the Kenuzi in northern Nubia; the 
beduin-descended Arabs in central Nubia; 
and the Fadija-speaking people in southern 
Nubia.”18 Furthermore, Nubians have been 
subjected to racist comments due to their 
dark skin, which distinguishes them from 
Egyptian Arabs.19
 Although Nubians were resettled 
twice under British mandate due to the 
construction of the Aswan Dam in 1902 
and its transformation into the Aswan Low 
Dam between 1913 and 1933, their major 
displacement took place between 1963 and 
1964, when around 50,000 Nubians were 
displaced into 33 villages north of the city 
of Aswan following the flooding caused by 
construction of the Aswan High Dam and 
the consequent Lake Nasser. Although the 
government compensated the Nubians with 
new homes following their resettlement in 
the 1960s, Nubians were largely dissatisfied 
because they were provided uncomfortable, 
cement-block houses that were very 
different from their old homes. Moreover, 
their resettlement “disrupted family ties 
and ignored historical rivalries among the 
three Nubian ethnic groups,” since Nubia 
had its own pluralism; the different tribal 
groups in Nubia spoke different languages 
and had competing interests. Further, the 
resettlement of Nubians did not take into 
consideration the Nubian identity, as many 
schools in the new areas taught only Arabic, 
thereby weakening the younger generations’ 
ties with their Nubian identity and history.20 
Additionally, the government forced certain 
conditions upon the Nubian farmers, such 
as requiring them to join agricultural 
cooperatives and pressuring them to add 
commercial crops like sugarcane that were 
not part of their traditional agricultural 
heritage. All of these issues led the Nubians 
to start reconstructing their own villages in 
their ancestral lands around Lake Nasser’s 
shores. By the 1980s, they succeeded in 
building about four villages.21 
 Today, Nubians’ main demand is the 
right to return back to “their ancestral home” 
around the Nile River Valley in Upper Egypt. 
Although the post-revolution constitution of 
2014 recognized the land as belonging to the 
Nubians and declared that the area would 
be developed within 10 years (Article 236),22 
a decree issued by El-Sisi in January 2016 
proclaimed this area “off-limits and under 
military control.”23 
III. SHIITES
The estimated Shiite population in Egypt 
ranges between 800,000 and 2 million, 
according to a 2016 U.S. Department of 
State Report.24 However, there is no official 
census or data from the Central Agency for 
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Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) 
on the size of this religious community. 
They cannot practice their religion openly 
and do not have any official representation 
in parliament or in the government. The 
Ministry of Religious Endowments, which 
runs the affairs of all mosques in Egypt 
in accordance with Sunni doctrine, does 
not officially recognize Shia mosques, 
congregations, or rituals.25 Shiites in Egypt 
have been prohibited from commemorating 
the Day of Ashura—the day that the prophet 
Muhammad’s grandson Hussain ibn Ali was 
assassinated—in the Al-Hussain mosque 
since 2011, when seven Shiites who were 
part of a larger group that attempted to 
commemorate Ashura were arrested, 
leading to subsequent clashes with Salafists. 
Two days prior to Ashura day in 2016, the 
ministry decided to close the mosque 
to prevent any sectarian clashes on the 
grounds that “observing the day of Ashura 
in Cairo has been subject to rising sectarian 
tensions over the last few years, leading 
religious authorities to ban any form of 
congregation at Al-Hussein Mosque on this 
day.” Moreover, on May 18, 2015, a Shiite 
religious leader, al-Taher al-Hashemi, was 
arrested under allegations “of attempting to 
spread Shia Islam in Egypt.”26
 Shiites have long been subjected to 
defamation and hate speech, as some Salafi 
and Islamist groups do not accept Shiites 
as Muslims.27 For example, the prominent 
Sunni sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi has been 
known for his anti-Shiite rhetoric; he has 
explicitly expressed his dissatisfaction 
that Shiites are not only present in Egypt 
but also write books and appear on 
television. Qaradawi’s anti-Shiite discourse 
is significant because he has millions 
of followers and is highly regarded by 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
some Salafi groups.28 
 In 2013, four Shiites were assassinated 
by a mob in Giza, including prominent 
sheikh Hassan Shehata, a famous former 
Sunni scholar who converted to Shiism, 
who was stabbed 21 times.29 Shehata’s 
murder raised the possibility of a sectarian 
clash in Egypt between Sunnis and Shiites, 
since Bahaa Al Anwar, a spokesman for 
the Shiites in Egypt, blamed the Muslim 
Brotherhood and then-Egyptian president 
Mohamed Morsi for the attack, stating 
that the assassination occurred within an 
“organized terrorist context against the 
Shiites in Egypt.”30 Furthermore, private 
sector employers often discriminate against 
Shiites.31 Shiites have also been subjected 
to arbitrary arrests, and their books are 
often confiscated or prohibited.32 
IV. BEDOUINS (NOMADS) IN SA’ID  
AND SINAI
The Bedouins are indigenous people 
characterized by their nomadic lifestyle, 
traditional living conditions, and unique 
culture. Bedouins in Egypt mostly reside in 
Sinai; their population in the peninsula is 
estimated to be around 380,000, divided 
over about 26 different tribes.33 Most of 
the Bedouins in Sinai migrated from the 
Arabian Peninsula between the 14th and 18th 
centuries.34 Bedouins are also scattered 
within Egypt, mainly in Sa’id. 
 Bedouins face three major problems 
in Egypt as a distinct minority community: 
poverty, illiteracy, and economic and social 
exclusion.35 Due to historical neglect, 
Bedouins in Sa’id and Sinai have suffered 
from extreme poverty, unemployment, and 
deteriorating public services and facilities in 
areas such as sanitation, health, education, 
and housing.36 For instance, 49% of Sa’idis 
in rural areas, who are mostly nomads, 
suffer from poverty, compared to 27% of 
the urban Sa’idi population.37 
 Al Sa’id, which encompasses 25% of the 
Egyptian population and 10 governorates, 
suffers from sharp tribal divisions in the 
absence of an inclusive approach by the 
government to resolve the long-standing 
conflicts.38 Bedouins in Sinai lived under 
Israeli occupation from 1967 until the early 
1980s, creating a wedge of distrust between 
them and the rest of Egyptian society. The 
nomads of Sinai have experienced mostly 
violence from the state as their interactions 
have primarily involved the military, 
including the previous Israeli occupation and 
military actions in response to the state’s 
concern about spy activity and the rise of 
the extremist threats over the last decade. 
5 Consequently, Bedouins are the 
victims of recurrent stereotypes not only 
among the Egyptian population but also 
by government officials. They are mostly 
perceived as drug dealers, terrorists, 
spies, or smugglers. Since poverty and 
unemployment have become their daily 
reality, Bedouin tribes have resorted to 
smuggling goods to Palestinians in the 
Gaza Strip. However, in 2012, the Egyptian 
government blocked them from smuggling 
by launching an anti-terror campaign in 
Sinai and destroying approximately 120 
tunnels between the two sides.39 
 In addition to their marginalization, the 
nomads’ limited access to the Nile River 
Valley has created a sense of economic 
entrapment and discrimination among the 
Bedouins. Sinai is a dry and infertile area, and 
until 2017, the proportion of developed land 
in Sharm el-Sheikh that was being used by 
Bedouins did not exceed 1.6%, while the 
rest of the region was utilized for tourism 
activities;40 Bedouins are excluded from the 
tourism sector, as they are denied jobs in the 
field and do not benefit from the economic 
gains of tourism.41 This discrimination 
is rooted in years of “land dispossession, 
underdevelopment, and neglect.”42 The 
state does not acknowledge any Bedouin 
land ownership rights but rather considers 
these lands as state property; in fact, the 
government established the Tourism 
Development Authority (TDA) as an official 
manager of the area under the 1991 law 
number 7. Specifically, Article 2 stipulates 
that the TDA has the right to manage and use 
the desert lands for tourism purposes.43 The 
TDA has been implementing its tourism vision 
in Sinai and sold land to private companies 
without the slightest concern for the Bedouin 
inhabitants in the area.44 Furthermore, 
the people in Sinai have been suffering 
immensely from the state of emergency 
imposed on their territory since August 2013 
following the assassination of 25 soldiers by 
anonymous gunmen. The state of emergency 
imposes curfews over the peninsula’s 
residents (generally from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m.) 
and leaves them vulnerable to harassment 
and arbitrary arrests.45 
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IMPLICATIONS
In light of these issues, several steps can 
be taken to improve the state of pluralism 
and inclusion in the Egyptian state and 
society. The most important step would be 
the official recognition of the different ethnic 
and religious minorities in Egypt, followed 
by an outspoken acknowledgment of the 
de facto discriminatory incidents that have 
been occurring. Such acknowledgment 
will pave the way for launching official 
measures and constructive actions to 
counter discrimination and ensure equality 
and justice among all citizens regardless 
of religious affiliation or tribal background. 
Discourse on national unity and a unified 
national identity that is not reflected in state 
policies and actions amounts to no more 
than an attempt to veil an existing conflict, 
ultimately exacerbating the problems. The 
pertinent challenges need to be articulated 
and addressed openly in order to include the 
different factions in the country and work 
toward a more inclusive state. 
 Ensuring fair representation for minority 
groups in parliament and the government 
requires an accurate population count 
for the different minority groups in the 
country. In this regard, a census conducted 
through CAPMAS that identifies the size of 
the various ethnic and religious groups in 
the country will be a positive step toward 
assuring equal representation of all groups. 
 As mentioned above, the state of 
emergency imposed on Sinai in August 
2013 undermines the daily life and rights of 
Bedouins by subjecting them to arbitrary 
detention and restricting their freedom of 
movement, which is a fundamental violation 
of the Bedouins’ nomadic lifestyle. The state 
of emergency has to be lifted if the state 
seeks to ensure a normal and peaceful life 
that restores the full rights of Bedouins. 
 Finally, economic development policies 
in areas where Nubians and Bedouins live 
are critical to overcoming the longstanding 
economic disparities these groups have 
experienced. Reconstruction of the 
Nubians’ homeland and stimulation of their 
sociopolitical and economic life through 
governmental plans and institutions are 
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essential steps in this direction. Likewise, 
restoring previously removed government 
subsidies for water and other agricultural 
products, mainly Egypt’s renowned cotton 
crops, would rejuvenate agricultural 
production. Introducing industrialization 
within these two areas can also open many 
job opportunities.
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